As architectural phenomenology became established in academia, professors developed theory seminars that tried to expand the movement's range of ideas beyond Gaston Bachelard ,  and Martin Heidegger , to include Edmund Husserl , Maurice Merleau-Ponty ,  Hans-Georg Gadamer Hannah Arendt and an ever wider group of theorists whose modes of thinking bordered on phenomenology, such as Gilles Deleuze , Henri Bergson , and Paul Virilio urban planner.
See the work of Jean Labatut. See the work of Charles W. See the work of Mohsen Mostafavi and David Leatherbarrow . The phenomenon of dwelling was a central research theme in architectural phenomenology. Much of the way it was understood in architecture was shaped by the later thought of Martin Heidegger as set in his influential essay: Prominent architects, such as Daniel Libeskind Steven Holl and Peter Zumthor are described by Juhani Pallasmaa as current practitioners of the phenomenology of architecture.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Phenomenology and the Rise of the Postmodern. University of Minnesota Press. Invocations of Phenomenology in Architectural Discourse, , Ph. Retrieved from " https: Architectural theory Modernist architecture Postmodern architecture Deconstructivism Phenomenological methodology.
Eidetic intuition is, in short, an a priori method of gaining knowledge of necessities. However, the result of the eidetic reduction is not just that we come to knowledge of essences, but that we come to intuitive knowledge of essences. Essences show themselves to us Wesensschau , although not to sensory intuition, but to categorial or eidetic intuition Husserl , It might be argued that Husserl's methods here are not so different from the standard methods of conceptual analysis: It is widely accepted that few of the most significant post-Husserlian phenomenologists accepted Husserl's prescribed methodology in full.
Although there are numerous important differences between the later phenomenologists, the influence of Heidegger runs deep. On the nature of phenomena, Heidegger remarks that "the term 'phenomenon'…signifies 'to show itself'" Heidegger , sec.
Phenomena are things that show themselves and the phenomenologist describes them as they show themselves. So, at least on this score there would appear to be some affinity between Husserl and Heidegger.
However, this is somewhat controversial, with some interpreters understanding Husserlian phenomena not as things as given , but as states of the experiencing subject Carman What Heidegger says in his early work, however, is that, for him, the phenomenological reduction has a different sense than it does for Husserl:. For Husserl , phenomenological reduction… is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness….
For us phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of a being…to the understanding of the being of this being. Certainly, Heidegger thinks of the reduction as revealing something different—the Being of beings. But this is not yet to say that his philosophy does not engage in bracketing,for we can distinguish between the reduction itself and its claimed consequences. There is, however, some reason to think that Heidegger's position is incompatible with Husserl's account of the phenomenological reduction.
For, on Husserl's account, the reduction is to be applied to the "general positing" of the natural attitude, that is to a belief. But, according to Heidegger and those phenomenologists influenced by him including both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty , our most fundamental relation to the world is not cognitive but practical Heidegger , sec.
Heidegger's positive account of the methods of phenomenology is explicit in its ontological agenda. A single question dominates the whole of Heidegger's philosophy: What is the meaning of being? To understand this, we can distinguish between beings entities and Being. Heidegger calls this "the ontological difference. But Being is always the being of a being. Being is essentially different from a being, from beings…We call it the ontological difference —the differentiation between Being and beings" Heidegger , Tables, chairs, people, theories, numbers and universals are all beings.
But they all have being , they all are. An understanding at the level of beings is "ontical," an understanding at the level of being is "ontological". Every being has being, but what does it mean to say of some being that it is? Might it be that what it means to say that something is differs depending on what sort of thing we are talking about? Do tables, people, numbers have being in the same way?
Is there such a thing as the meaning of being in general? The task is, for each sort of being, to give an account of the structural features of its way of Being, "Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of being, of being's structure and its possibilities" Heidegger , According to Heidegger, we have a "pre-ontological" understanding of being: If we did not understand, even though at first roughly and without conceptual comprehension, what actuality signifies, then the actual would remain hidden from us…We must understand being so that we may be able to be given over to a world that is " Heidegger , Our understanding of being is manifested in our "comportment towards beings" Heidegger , Comportment is activity, action or behaviour.
Thus, the understanding that we have of the Being of beings can be manifested in our acting with them. One's understanding of the being of toothbrushes, for example, is manifested in one's capacity for utilizing toothbrushes. Understanding need not be explicit, nor able to be articulated conceptually. It is often embodied in "know-how. It is this that poses a challenge to the phenomenological reduction. Heidegger's relation to the eidetic reduction is complex.
The purpose of the eidetic reduction in Husserl's writings is to bracket any considerations concerning the contingent and accidental, and concentrate on intuit the essential natures of the objects and acts of consciousness.
Heidegger's concentration on the meaning of the Being of entities appears similar in aim. However, insofar as the Being of entities relies on the notion of essence, Heidegger's project calls it into question. The idea that there are different "ways of being" looks as though it does not abide by the traditional distinction between existence and essence. So, on Heidegger's account, what it takes for something to have being is different for different sorts of thing.
How is it that subjective mental processes perceptions, thoughts, etc. This question is one that occupied Husserl perhaps more than any other, and his account of the intentionality of consciousness is central to his attempted answer. Intentionality is one of the central concepts of Phenomenology from Husserl onwards. As a first approximation, intentionality is aboutness or directedness as exemplified by mental states.
One can also hope, desire, fear, remember, etc. Intentionality is, say many, the way that subjects are "in touch with" the world. Two points of terminology are worth noting. First, in contemporary non-phenomenological debates, "intentional" and its cognates is often used interchangeably with "representational" and its cognates.
The former refers to aboutness which is the current topic , the latter refers to failure of truth-preservation after substitution of co-referring terms. Franz Brentano, Husserl's one time teacher, is the origin of the contemporary debate about intentionality. He famously, and influentially claimed:. Every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional or mental inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing or immanent objectivity.
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. Brentano thought that all and only psychological states exhibit intentionality, and that in this way the subject matter of psychology could be demarcated. His, early and notorious, doctrine of intentional inexistence maintains that the object of an intentional state is literally a part of the state itself, and is, therefore, an "immanent" psychological entity.
This position is based on Brentano's adherence to something like the first interpretation of the Kantian notion of phenomena mentioned above Crane Since phenomenology is descriptive, Husserl's aim is to describe rather than explain or reduce intentionality.
Husserl differs from Brentano in that he thinks that, apart from some special cases, the object of an intentional act is a transcendent object. That is, the object of an intentional act is external to the act itself Husserl , Husserl's "acts" are not to be thought of as actions, or even as active.
For example, on Husserl's view, a visual experience is a conscious act Husserl , The object of the belief that Paris is the capital of France is Paris and France. This is in keeping with the suggestion above that when phenomenologists describe phenomena, they describe worldly things as they are presented in conscious acts , not mental entities.
Intentionality is not a relation, but rather an intrinsic feature of intentional acts. Relations require the existence of their relata the things related to one another , but this is not true of intentionality conceived as directedness towards a transcendent object. The object of my belief can fail to exist if my belief is, for example, about Father Christmas.
On Husserl's picture, every intentional act has an intentional object, an object that the act is about, but they certainly needn't all have a real object Husserl , Husserl distinguishes between the intentional matter meaning of a conscious act and its intentional quality , which is something akin to its type Husserl , Something's being a belief, desire, perception, memory, etc.
A conscious act's being about a particular object, taken in a particular way, is its intentional matter. An individual act has a meaning that specifies an object.
It is important to keep these three distinct. To see that the latter two are different, note that two intentional matters meanings can say the same thing of the same object, if they do it in a different way.
To see that the first two act and meaning are distinct, on Husserl's view, meanings are ideal that is, not spatio-temporal , and therefore transcend the acts that have them Husserl , However, intentional acts concretely instantiate them. In this way, psychological subjects come into contact with both ideal meaning and the worldly entities meant. In his Ideas I , Husserl introduced a new terminology to describe the structure of intentionality.
He distinguished between the noesis and the noema , and he claimed that phenomenology involved both noetic and noematic analysis Husserl , pt. The noesis is the act of consciousness; this notion roughly corresponds to what Husserl previously referred to as the "intentional quality.
The noema is variously interpreted as either the intentional object as it is intended or the ideal content of the intentional act. Thus, noematic analysis looks at the structure of meaning or objects as they are given to consciousness.
Exactly how to interpret Husserl's notions of the noema and noematic analysis are much debated Smith , , and this debate goes right to the heart of Husserlian phenomenology. On Husserl's view, intentionality is aboutness or directedness as exemplified by conscious mental acts. Heidegger and, following him, Merleau-Ponty broaden the notion of intentionality, arguing that it fails to describe what is in fact the most fundamental form of intentionality.
The usual conception of intentionality…misconstrues the structure of the self-directedness-toward…. An ego or subject is supposed, to whose so-called sphere intentional experiences are then supposed to belong…. The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its own sphere and is not yet outside it but encapsulated within itself is an absurdity.
Heidegger introduces the notion of comportment as a meaningful directedness towards the world that is, nevertheless, more primitive than the conceptually structured intentionality of conscious acts, described by Husserl Heidegger , Comportment is an implicit openness to the world that continually operates in our habitual dealings with the world.
As Heidegger puts it, we are "always already dwelling with the extant". Heidegger's account of comportment is related to his distinction, in Being and Time , between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand.
These describe two ways of being of worldly entities. We are aware of things as present-at-hand, or occurrent , through what we can call the "theoretical attitude.
Thus, a hammer, seen through the detached contemplation of the theoretical attitude, is a material thing with the property of hardness, woodenness etc. This is to be contrasted with the ready-to-hand. In our average day-to-day comportments, Dasein encounters equipment as ready-to-hand, "The kind of Being which equipment possesses - in which it manifests itself in its own right - we call ' readiness-to-hand '" Heidegger , sec. Equipment shows itself as that which is in-order-to , that is, as that which is for something.
A pen is equipment for writing, a fork is equipment for eating, the wind is equipment for sailing, etc. Equipment is ready-to-hand, and this means that it is ready to use , handy , or available. The readiness-to-hand of equipment is its manipulability in our dealings with it. A ready-to-hand hammer has various properties, including Being-the-perfect-size-for-the-job-at-hand. Heidegger claims that these "dealings" with "equipment" have their own particular kind of "sight": Circumspection is the way in which we are aware of the ready-to-hand.
It is the kind of awareness that we have of "equipment" when we are using it but are not explicitly concentrating on it or contemplating it, when it recedes.
For example, in driving, one is not explicitly aware of the wheel. Rather, one knowledgeably use it; one has "know how. Merleau-Ponty's account of intentionality introduces, more explicitly than does Heidegger's, the role of the body in intentionality.
His account of "motor intentionality" treats bodily activities, and not just conscious acts in the Husserlian sense, as themselves intentional. Much like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty describes habitual, bodily activity as a directedness towards worldly entities that are for something, what he calls "a set of manipulanda " Merleau-Ponty , Again, like Heidegger, he argues that motor intentionality is a basic phenomenon, not to be understood in terms of the conceptually articulated intentionality of conscious acts, as described by Husserl.
As Merleau-Ponty says, "it is the body which 'catches' and 'comprehends movement'. The acquisition of a habit is indeed the grasping of a significance, but it is the motor grasping or a motor significance" Merleau-Ponty , And again, "it is the body which 'understands'" Merleau-Ponty , Perceptual experience is one of the perennial topics of phenomenological research.
Husserl devotes a great deal of attention to perception, and his views have been very influential. We will concentrate, as does Husserl, on the visual perception of three dimensional spatial objects.
To understand Husserl's view, some background will be helpful. We ordinarily think of perception as a relation between ourselves and things in the world. We think of perceptual experience as involving the presentation of three dimensional spatio-temporal objects and their properties.
Various arguments have been put forward in an attempt to show that it cannot be correct. The following is just one such:. An indirect realist view holds that there really are both kinds of object. Worldly objects both cause and are represented by sense data. However, this has often been thought to lead to a troubling skepticism regarding ordinary physical objects: That is, as far as one's perceptual experience goes, one could be undergoing one prolonged hallucination.
So, for all one knows, there are no ordinary physical objects. Some versions of a view known as phenomenalism answer this skeptical worry by maintaining that ordinary physical objects are nothing more than logical constructions out of collections of actual and possible sense data. The standard phenomenalist claim is that statements about ordinary physical objects can be translated into statements that refer only to experiences Ayer A phenomenalist might claim that the physical object statement "there is a white sheep in the kitchen" could be analysed as "if one were to currently be experiencing sense-data as of the inside of the kitchen, then one would experience a white, sheep-shaped sense-datum.
First, it includes the unanalysed physical object term "kitchen. Nevertheless, the phenomenalist is committed to the claim that there is some adequate translation into statements that refer only to experiences. However, another route out of the argument from hallucination is possible.
This involves the denial that when one suffers a hallucination there is some object of which one is aware. That is, one denies premise 1 of the argument. Intentional theories of perception deny that perceptual experience is a relation to an object.
Rather, perception is characterised by intentionality. The possibility of hallucinations is accounted for by the fact that my perceptual intentions can be inaccurate or "non-veridical. One's conscious experience has an intentional object, but not a real one. This, of course, is the fundamental orientation of Husserl 's view. In sensory perception we are intentionally directed toward a transcendent object.
We enjoy, "concrete intentive mental processes called perceivings of physical things" Husserl , sec. As Husserl writes, "The spatial physical thing which we see is, with all its transcendence, still something perceived, given 'in person' in the manner peculiar to consciousness" Husserl , sec. But if perceiving is characterised by intentionality, what distinguishes it from other intentional phenomena, such as believing? What is the difference between seeing that there is a cat on the mat and believing that there is a cat on the mat?
Part of Husserl's answer to this is that perception has a sensory character. As one commentary puts it, "The authentic appearance of an object of perception is the intentional act inasmuch and to the extent that this act is interwoven with corresponding sensational data" Bernet, Kern, and Marbach , The "sensational data" also called hyle are non-intentional, purely sensory aspects of experience.
Sensory data are, on Husserl's account, "animated" by intentions, which "interpret" them Husserl , Thus, although perception is an intentional phenomenon, it is not purely intentional; it also has non-intentional, sensory qualities. In contemporary debates over intentionality and consciousness , those who believe that experiences have such non-intentional qualities are sometimes said to believe in qualia.
When we visually perceive a three-dimensional, spatial object, we see it from one particular perspective. This means that we see one of its sides at the expense of the others and its insides. We see a profile, aspect or, as Husserl puts it, "adumbration. Husserl thinks not, claiming that a more phenomenologically adequate description of the experience would maintain that, "Of necessity a physical thing can be given only 'one-sidedly;' A physical thing is necessarily given in mere 'modes of appearance' in which necessarily a core of ' what is actually presented ' is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of ' co-givenness '" Husserl , sec.
Husserl refers to that which is co-given as a "horizon," distinguishing between the internal and external horizons of a perceived object Husserl , sec. The internal horizon of an experience includes those aspects of the object rear aspect and insides that are co-given. The external horizon includes those objects other than those presented that are co-given as part of the surrounding environment. In visual experience we are intentionally directed towards the object as a whole, but its different aspects are given in different ways.
Husserl often uses the term "anticipation" to describe the way in which the merely co-presented is present in perceptual experience. In these terms, only the front aspect of an object is "genuinely perceived. This anticipation consists, in part, in expectations of how the object will appear in subsequent experiences. These anticipations count as genuinely perceptual, but they lack the "intuitional fullness" of the fully presented.
The non-intuitional emptiness of the merely co-given can be brought into intuitional fullness precisely by making the previously co-given rear aspect fully present, say, by moving around the object. Perceptual anticipations have an "if Above, phenomenalism was characterised in two ways. On one, the view is that ordinary physical objects are nothing more than logical constructions out of collections of actual and possible sense data.
One the other, the view is that statements about ordinary physical objects can be translated into statements that refer only to experiences. But, in fact, these views are not equivalent. The first, but not the second, is committed to the existence of sense data. Husserl's intentional account of perception does not postulate sense data, so he is not a phenomenalist of the first sort. However, there is some reason to believe that he may be a phenomenalist of the second sort.
Concerning unperceived objects, Husserl writes:. That the unperceived physical thing "is there" means rather that, from my actually present perceptions, with the actually appearing background field, possible and, moreover, continuously-harmoniously motivated perception-sequences, with ever new fields of physical things as unheeded backgrounds lead to those concatenations of perceptions in which the physical thing in question would make its appearance and become seized upon.
That is, he appears to endorse something that looks rather like the second form of phenomenalism—the view that statements about physical objects can be translated into statements that only make reference to actual and possible appearances. Thus, there is some reason to think that Husserl may be a phenomenalist, even though he rejects the view that perceptual experience is a relation to a private, subjective sense datum. Sartre accepts, at least in broad outline, Husserl's view of intentionality although he steers clear of Husserl's intricate detail.
Intentionality, which Sartre agrees is characteristic of consciousness, is directedness toward worldly objects and, importantly for Sartre, it is nothing more than this.
He writes, "All at once consciousness is purified, it is clear as a strong wind. There is nothing in it but a movement of fleeing itself, a sliding beyond itself" Sartre , 4. Consciousness is nothing but a directedness elsewhere, towards the world. Sartre's claim that consciousness is empty means that there are no objects or qualities in consciousness. So, worldly objects are not in consciousness; sense data are not in consciousness; qualia are not in consciousness; the ego is not in consciousness.
In so far as these things exist, they are presented to consciousness. Consciousness is nothing more than directedness toward the world.
Thus, Sartre rejects Husserl's non-intentional, purely sensory qualities. A test case for Sartre's view concerning the emptiness of consciousness is that of bodily sensation for example, pain. A long tradition has held that bodily sensations, such as pain, are non-intentional, purely subjective qualities Jackson , chap.
Sartre is committed to rejecting this view. However, the most obvious thing with which to replace it is the view according to which bodily sensations are perceptions of the body as painful, or ticklish, etc. On such a perceptual view , pains are experienced as located properties of an object—one's body.
However, Sartre also rejects the idea that when one is aware of one's body as subject and being aware of something as having pains is a good candidate for this , one is not aware of it as an object Sartre , Thus, Sartre is committed to rejecting the perceptual view of bodily sensations. In place of either of these views, Sartre proposes an account of pains according to which they are perceptions of the world. He offers the following example:.
My eyes are hurting but I should finish reading a philosophical work this evening…how is the pain given as pain in the eyes? Is there not here an intentional reference to a transcendent object, to my body precisely in so far as it exists outside in the world? Pain is precisely the eyes in so far as consciousness "exists them"….
It is the-eyes-as-pain or vision-as-pain; it is not distinguished from my way of apprehending transcendent words. Bodily sensations are not given to unreflective consciousness as located in the body.
They are indicated by the way objects appear. Having a pain in the eyes amounts to the fact that, when reading, "It is with more difficulty that the words are detached from the undifferentiated ground" Sartre , What we might intuitively think of as an awareness of a pain in a particular part of the body is nothing more than an awareness of the world as presenting some characteristic difficulty.
A pain in the eyes becomes an experience of the words one is reading becoming indistinct, a pain in the foot might become an experience of one's shoes as uncomfortable. There are a number of philosophical views concerning both the nature of the self and any distinctive awareness we may have of it. Husserl's views on the self, or ego , are best understood in relation to well known discussions by Hume and Kant. Phenomenological discussions of the self and self-awareness cannot be divorced from issues concerning the unity of consciousness.
Hume's account of the self and self-awareness includes one of the most famous quotations in the history of philosophy. There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence…. For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself , I always stumble on some particular perception or other, or heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. Hume claims that reflection does not reveal a continuously existing self. Rather, all that reflection reveals is a constantly changing stream of mental states.
In Humean terms, there is no impression of self and, as a consequence of his empiricism, the idea that we have of ourselves is rendered problematic. The concept self is not one which can be uncritically appealed to. However, as Hume recognized, this appears to leave him with a problem, a problem to which he could not see the answer: This problem concerns the unity of consciousness. In fact there are at least two problems of conscious unity.
The first problem concerns the synchronic unity of consciousness and the distinction between subjects of experience. Consider four simultaneous experiences: What makes it the case that, say, e1 and e2 are experiences had by one subject, A, while e3 and e4 are experiences had by another subject, B? One simple answer is that there is a relation that we could call ownership such that A bears ownership to both e1 and e2, and B bears ownership to both e3 and e4.
However if, with Hume, we find the idea of the self problematic, we are bound to find the idea of ownership problematic. For what but the self could it be that owns the various experiences? The second problem concerns diachronic unity.
Consider four successive conscious experiences, e1, e2, e3 and e4, putatively had by one subject, A. What makes it the case that there is just one subject successively enjoying these experiences? That is, what makes the difference between a temporally extended stream of conscious experience and merely a succession of experiences lacking any experienced unity? An answer to this must provide a relation that somehow accounts for the experienced unity of conscious experience through time.
So, what is it for two experiences, e1 and e2, to belong to the same continuous stream of consciousness? One thought is that e1 and e2 must be united, or synthesised, by the self. On this view, the self must be aware of both e1 and e2 and must bring them together in one broader experience that encompasses them.
If this is right then, without the self to unify my various experiences, there would be no continuous stream of conscious experience, just one experience after another lacking experiential unity. But our experience is evidently not like this.
If the unity of consciousness requires the unifying power of the self, then Hume's denial of self-awareness, and any consequent doubts concerning the legitimacy of the idea of the self, are deeply problematic. Kant's view of these matters is complex.
Phenomenology (from Greek phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and igmosb.gq a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl and was later expanded upon by a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany.
Research Methodology chapter describes research methods, approaches and designs in detail highlighting those used throughout the study, justifying my choice through describing advantages and disadvantages of each approach and design taking into account their practical applicability to our research.
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28 Administratio Publica | Vol 20 No 3 September managers' and policymakers' decisions. If a less applicable research design is used, the final product will be questionable. This article serves as a call to Public Administration researchers to use. Phenomenology in architecture can be understood as an aspect of philosophy researching into the experience of built space, and as shorthand for architectural phenomenology, a .